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Abstract: The goal of any professional athlete is to receive a multi-year contract that 
guarantees them a salary for multiple years. However, a concern that fans, coaches and 
owners all share is that when a player receives a multi-year contract they may have a 
strong incentive to shirk. Shirking is when a player purposely does not perfonn to the 
best of his ability and may occur when a player has a guaranteed salary. The goa� of this 
paper is to determine if a Major League Baseball player with a multi-year contract will 
show any pattern of shirking throughout the contract. Each of the fifty players has a four 
year contract and the theories of moral hazard and asymmetric infonnation suggest that a 
player may shirk during the contract until the last year. Descriptive statistics and OLS 
regression results provide evidence that Major League Baseball players with four year 
contracts do not have a pattern of shirking. Job security, above market wages and 
monitoring may be the important concepts explaining why there is no evidence for 
shirking. 
I. Introduction 
"The experience of individual clubs, and the industry as a whole, is that for 
whatever reason, the player's performance is not the same following the signing of a new 
multi-year contract." This quote from Dan O'Brien, the fonner vice president of 
negotiations for the Cleveland Indians, represents the common perception that many 
people, from owners to fans, havc of current Major League Baseball (MLB) players 
(Berri and Krautmann, 2006). Multi-year contracts provide a player with a strong sense 
of security which people such as Dan O'Brien believe may also result in the player 
shirking. 
Shirking is when a player purposely does not perform to the best of his ability and 
may occur when a player has a guaranteed salary. A longer contract gives a player more 
0ppoliunity to shirk without losing his salary. A player is considered shirking when he 
does not put all of his effort into the training, workouts, or even his games. He can shirk 
during the season as well as during the off-season. A benefit of shirking for a player is 
that the player may extend his career because he is not putting his body through as 
extreme measures. Also, shirking during some part of his contract and not others may 
give the appearance that a player is improving or a better player than he really is. 
However, even though there are benefits of shirking to the player, fans and owners have 
an interest in making sure a player is not shirking. Since the owners and fans are 
spending so much money on the player they want to ensure that they are receiving the 
best return for their investment. In other words, owners and fans expect MLB players to 
perfonn to their potential in every game. 
The focus of this paper is to see if a multi-year contract provides an incentive for 
a MLB player to shirk. Multi-year contracts were not common in MLB until after free 
agency was developed in 1977. Today these contracts are rarely used for a player who 
has below average skills, little experience, or is nearing his retirement age. However 
teams still offer these types of contracts because it helps the team avoid a high amount of 
player turnover. A multi-year contract is important because teams have to pay the player 
the amount specified in the contract even if the player does not meet performance 
expectations, becomes injured and cannot play, or is released from the team (Meltzer, 
2005 and Dinerstein, 2007). This study uses productivity measures to determine if a 
player actually does shirk when he has a multi-year contract. 
The negotiation status of a player affects the ability of teams and players to 
negotiate contracts. Contract lengths for players that have been in the majors for less 
than six years are not detetmined by free negotiations. Owners have an advantage over 
the players during these first six years since players are not able to freely move around 
the league. As a result, the data in this paper only includes players that have been in the 
league for more than six years and are thus classified as "free agents." 
Moral hazard and asymmetric information theories, as well as human capital 
theories, are the underlying theories for evaluating the effect of a multi-year contract on a 
player's productivity. These theories may create different incentives for a player to 
decide if he wants to shirk or not. The hypothesis for this paper is that the concepts of 
moral hazard and asymmetric infonnation cause a player to shirk during the middle years 
of a contract until the last year when a player's productivity begins to increase. To test 
this hypothesis an OLS regression is run with the productivity of a player as the 
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dependent variable and each contract year (as well as control variables) as the 
independent variables. 
However, management may have discovered ways to prevent a MLB player from 
shirking. By using techniques, such as incentives and monitoring, owners could 
successfully thwart a player's attempt to shirk. If the owners are successful then this 
paper will not tind the pattern suggested by the theory. 
This paper continues by first addressing related literature (section II) and moving 
on to a discussion of the theory (section III). A section discussing the data in this paper 
(section IV) and a section addressing the empirical model (section V) follow the 
discussion of the theory. Finally, there is a discussion of the results (section VI) and 
conclusions (section VII). 
II. Review of Related Empirical Studies 
Using economic theories to analyze professional sports, particularly baseball, has 
become very popular over the last few decades. Multiple studies have been conducted 
that address the contracts, salaries and perfonnance of MLB players. Some of these 
studies look at how previous performances affect the contract length and the salaries that 
the players receive (Meltzer, 2005; Dinerstein, 2007; and Tarman, 2005). These studies 
look at how owners evaluate players and examine contract detennination from the 
perspective of the teams. These are solid starting places for this study. 
The common focus of contract studies is the relationship between perfonnance 
and the salary or contract length of a player. In these studies the dependent variable is 
contract length or salary, and the independent variable is the productivity of the player. 
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One of these studies was perfonned by Josh Meltzer (2005), who tested if perfonnance is 
a significant predictor of a salary for a MLB player. His regression results demonstrated 
that performance was a significant predictor, which confinned his hypothesis and the 
conclusion of other researchers. These results mean that the better player receives a 
longer contract and this often leads to a salary premium on top of the length of the 
received contract (Meltzer, 2005). Therefore, young players that are improving and 
perfonning well receive longer contracts. 
Krautmann and Oppenheimer (2002) perfonned a similar study linking contract 
length to the salaries of MLB players. The authors perfonned an OLS regression and 
detennined that contract lenf,rth is positively related to wages. Earlier in their study, 
Krautmann and Oppenheimer detennined, based on their work and previous studies, that 
superior players tend to receive higher salaries. Consequently, contract length has a 
positive relationship to wages, since the best players receive the longest contracts in 
addition to the highest salaries. These studies are very important to my research because 
they provide proof that a strong relationship exists between contract length and the 
perfonnance of MLB players. This paper is furthering the existing research on this issue 
by determining whether productivity varies in a predictable way over the course of a 
multi-year contract. 
Similar to my study, many studies in economic literature have used productivity 
measures as dependent variables. Some common measurements of a player's 
productivity are the slugging percentage, the on base percentage (OBP), and the on base 
percentage plus slugging (OPS) of a player (Krautmann 1990; Dinerstein, 2007; Maxcy, 
2004; Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002; and Tannan, 2005). The OBP is the 
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percentage of times a player successfully reaches base without the other team making an 
error. The slugging percentage is the total number of bases that a player receives per at­
bat (Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002). For example, if a player hits a home run he is 
credited with four bases. The OPS adds these two measures of productivity together and 
is often viewed as the best measure of productivity. Two possible issues associated with 
OPS are that the statistic does not address all offensive statistics available to a player and 
it weights each offensive statistic the same. Equivalent Average (EqA) is a recently 
developed measure that represents the total offensive value per out for a player. EqA is 
slightly more comprehensive than OPS and it weights certain offensive statistics 
differently. OPS may not be as accurate as EqA because some offensive statistics may be 
more valuable than others. The complex fonnulas for EqA and OPS are presented in 
Section IV. 
Naturally, there are important variables to control for when evaluating a player's 
productivity. One of these variables that these studies address is the number of injury­
free games. When a player is injured he is not able to participate in games which 
decreases his productivity. A similar conclusion that papers on contract length reach is 
that a player that has a multi-year contract tends to be on the disabled list more than a 
player with a short-term contract. The job security that a player receives with a multi­
year contract will adversely affect the willingness of a player to play with an injury. 
(BetTi and Krautmann, 2006; Lehn, 1984). In fact, as the number of years in the contract 
increase the number of days that a player spends on the disabled list increases by twenty 
five percent (Krautmann, 1990; Lehn, 1984). A player with a multi-year contract is more 
willing to reveal his injuries to his team than a player that has a one year contract and he 
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is also less likely to rehabilitate as quickly as a player with a one year contract (Lehn, 
1984). Beni and Krautmann used games played as proxy to account for the effect of 
injury on a player's productivity. I choose to also use games played to account for 
injuries sustained by a player during the period of his contract. 
Games played can also be used to account for any on-the-job training that a player 
receives. On-the-job training provides a worker with more experience and therefore 
makes the worker more productive. A worker becomes more productive because on-the­
job training will increase the worker's general human capital as well as specific human 
capital (Strober, 1990). By playing more games a player is able to increase baseball 
skills as well as leam specific techniques that a team likes their players to have (i.e. base 
running strategies). Another aspect of training that a player will receive when he plays 
games is that he leams the strengths and weaknesses of his team. By knowing these 
strengths and weaknesses a player can adjust his play to complement them and give the 
team a better chance of winning. Therefore, a higher level of games played should cause 
a player to have a higher productivity and represents the contribution of a player to his 
team (Maxcy, 2002). 
However, the games played variable has an element of ambiguity as well. The 
games played variable may also ref1ect any shirking that a player is doing. For example, 
a player may decide to shirk by playing fewer games and therefore his number of games 
played during that year has decreased. As a result, it is dif1icult to determine if the 
amount of games a player has participated in is due to injury or shirking. 
Two other control variables in my study are dummy variables to represent if a 
player changed teams when he signed his multi-year contract and if incentives were built 
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into the contract. An incentive will likely cause a player to be more productive than he 
otherwise would have been if the incentive was not offered because he wants to have the 
extra money or security that the incentive provides. When a player is a free agent and is 
discussing a new contract, the team that he was previously with will have more 
information than other teams. Due to this lack of information the player's new team may 
offer him too good of a contract since the team does not necessarily know how well the 
player will actually perfonn or why the previous team has not asked the player to return 
(Pindyck, 2005; Berri and Krautmann, 2006). This suggests that a lemon market is 
present in baseball and the resulting asymmetric infonnation causes teams to be unaware 
of a player's true productivity. 
There were many more variables that these studies included that I have elected to 
not use in my study. Some of these variables include team chemistry, attitude, hustle, 
and intelligence (Maxcy, 2004). The productivity of a player will be affected by how 
well he works with his teammates and how well he knows the sport of baseball. 
Perhaps the most impOliant variable not included in this study is the ability of a player to 
shirk during the off-season as presented by Berri and Krautmann (2006). If a player does 
not take care of himself or prepare himself for the season he will not be as productive as 
he could be. While, each of these variables could have a positive effect on how well a 
player will perform they are difficult to quantify. As a result, these variables are not 
included in my empirical model. 
The negotiation status of a player atTects the type of contract the player will be 
offered. One status of a MLB player is that they are eligible for arbitration. A player 
becomes eligible for arbitration after three years in the MLB (Kahn, 1993). When a 
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player is eligible for arbitration he can sign a new contract but he can only sign with his 
cun-ent team. Arbitration gives a player the chance to negotiate for a higher salary but he 
cannot leave the team (Tarman, 2005). Salary disputes under arbitration are settled by 
the decision of a neutral arbitrator. A player is eligible for free agency atter six years in 
the MLB (Kahn, 1993). Free agency allows a player to sign with any team in the league 
so he does not have to remain with the team he is cun-ently on. Andrew Tarman states 
that because the draft and arbitration exist, " . . .  all players in baseball are not in a truly 
competitive market. " (1993). In his results, Kahn discovers that free agency will raise 
contract duration (Kahn, 1993). This is due to the fact that free agency puts extra risk on 
a team and multi-year contracts will help to mitigate it (Maxcy, 2004). Therefore a 
player that is in the draft or arbitration stages of his career is not acting independently of 
the team when contracts are negotiated. As a result, only free agents who have been in 
the MLB for at least six years are included in my sample. 
III. Theory 
The goal of MLB owners is to create the best possible team. In order to 
accomplish this they have to find the best players and attract them to their team. If an 
owner signs one of the better players, or a star player, to his team he wants to make sure 
he stays as long as possible due to market uncertainty. Market uncertainty refers to how 
easy it will be for the finn to find a worker equivalent to or better than the cun-ent 
worker. Maxcy (2004) found that market uncertainty will increase the chance of a player 
receiving a multi-year contract. This would be because teams protect themselves against 
the risk of not being able to replace the skill level of the player. This is especially true for 
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a star player. A star player is very difficult to replace with a player that has similar 
abilities. In other words, Maxcy found that the player who receives a long tenn contract 
is least likely to be replaced (Meltzer, 2005). Maxcy (2002) states, "Maxcy (1996) finds 
evidence that long-term contracts are awarded judiciously and primarily to those players 
who have demonstrated consistent and superior perfOlmance." Market uncertainty drives 
the owners desire to offer multi-year contracts. These contracts protect the owners from 
having constant turnover and from losing their star players (Krautmann, 1990). A player 
will agree to these long-tenn contracts because they are a source of guaranteed income 
and give the player some job security. 
However, the owner cannot relax completely once a �layer has signed a multi­
year contract. In addition to market uncertainty an owner has to consider a concept called 
productive unceliainty. Productive uncertainty is when an owner is unsure of how well 
the player will perfonn on the job in the future (Maxcy, 2004). Owners cannot know the 
player's exact productivity each year so they fonn an estimate based on his previous 
perfonnances (Krautmann, 1990). Production uncertainty under a long-term contract 
provides the opportunity for the player to shirk if he believes it is beneficial to him. 
Once a player receives the multi-year contract, and therefore a guaranteed income 
for multiple years, the player may begin to demonstrate moral hazard (Allen and Lueck, 
2001). Moral hazard occurs when an individual's behavior will change because he/she 
has insurance (Pindyck, 2005; Chiappori, 2002). With the insurance of a multi-year 
contract the individual is less likely to take necessary precautions. When it comes to 
baseball players, the moral hazard concept suggests that a player will not put in as much 
effort into preparing for the season or possibly even during the season due to the 
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insurance of his contract. The player has less incentive to devote his time to getting 
better or working hard. 
In order to make sure that a player does have the motivation to work hard and put 
forth his maximum effort an owner can work an incentive into the player's contract (Berri 
and Krautmann, 2006; Strober, 1990). Examples of incentives include bonuses for 
becoming a most valuable player (for the entire league and playoff series), becoming an 
all-star, receiving a Gold Glove, or being a Silver-Slugger. These incentives will be 
offered to the player with the best opportunity to shirk. A star player will have the best 
opportunity to shirk because his potential productivity can be very high. This gives the 
player a lot of opportunity to shirk and still have his actual productivity be at the level the 
owner is looking for. In order to avoid this situation, the owner can work in incentives 
into the star player's contract which will encourage him not to shirk and perform closer to 
his potential productivity. Chiappori and Salanie (2002) found that these incentives 
successfully encourage a worker to maximize hislher effort so the incentives in a MLB 
player's contract should encourage the player to maximize his human capital. 
Human capital is made up of skills or knowledge that will produce income for a 
worker (McConnell, 2009). Anything that a worker does to increase his/her productivity 
is considered an investment in human capital. For a baseball player, an example of 
investment in his human capital is training. Training consists of physical and labor inputs 
that will make him a better player by increasing skill level and thus increasing human 
capital. This investment in human capital therefore creates productivity potential 
(McConnell, 2009). When the player puts more time and effort into training and other 
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investments in human capital, he is increasing his chance of receiving a multi-year 
contract (Baker, 1988). 
However, training is a perfect opportunity for a player to shirk. Each player will 
detennine the total amount of effort that maximizes his utility and for some a guaranteed 
salary may cause them to have higher utility if they put in less effort (Marburger, 2003). 
A player has to put in effort in the weight room, during practice, and even to his diet in 
order to fully reach his productivity potential. If a player does not do these things, 
patiicularly during the off-season, his performance during the season will be weakened 
(Berri and Krautmann, 2006). The income effect may be a strong contributor to the 
decrease in the player's investment to his human capital. When he signs a multi-year 
contract, a player is getting a higher income which could cause him to choose leisure over 
working. As a result, the player may purposely spend less time conditioning himself for 
his season (BelTi and Krautmann, 2006; Krautmann, 1990; Baker, 1988). 
When either the owner or player does not have complete infonnation about a 
situation there is asymmetric infonnation (Pinkyck, 2005; Chiappori, 2002). By  knowing 
the limits of his human capital the player will have an advantage over the owner. The 
advantage that a player has is that he knows exactly how well he can perfonn while the 
owner can only base his expectations on previous perfonnances. This creates a prime 
situation for a player to shirk. Shirking is made possible by the moral hazard inherent in 
multi-year contracts and the asymmetric information between the owner and a player 
concerning the player's productive potential. As a result, the combination of asymmetric 
information and moral hazard suggests that the actual perfonnance of a player with a 
multi-year contract could be lower than his potential productivity. Only the player will 
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know that he is not doing everything he can do both during the off-season and the season. 
When the player is nearing contract negotiations he may choose to stop shirking to give 
the appearance that he is a hard worker, with improving productivity, deserving of 
another multi-year contract. Maxcy (2002) says that, "we find that time spent on the 
disabled list decreases in the period immediately preceding contract negotiations." Since 
the owner does not know exactly how well a player can perfonn, this decrease in time on 
the disabled list and increased productivity will appear to represent an improving player. 
The potential impact of the player's future income encourages him to fully utilize his 
human capital and meet his productivity potential (Marburger, 2003). In sum, moral 
hazard and asymmetric infonnation create the perfect opportunity, and excuse, for a 
player to shirk. 
Based on the previous literature and theory on this subject, the research 
hypothesis for my paper is that the concepts of moral hazard and asymmetric infonnation 
cause a pattern of shirking during the middle years of a contract. This pattern continues 
until the last year when a player's productivity begins to increase as the player competes 
for another multi-year contract. 
However, if management is aware that moral hazard and asymmetric information 
can lead to a pattern of shirking, it may take actions to minimize shirking. This could be 
done by setting up monitoring systems such as coaches and tans. Other options include 
offering a player an efficiency wage or incentives to ensure that he does not want to lose 
his job and will not shirk. If management is successful in reducing shirking through 
monitoring and incentives, there may not be a pattern of shirking. The purpose of the 
empirical model presented in the next section is to detennine whether a pattern of 
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shirking remains in a market where monitoring and incentives are used to discourage 
shirking. 
IV. Data 
To select the players in this data set I consulted an archived website that Meltzer 
(2005) used in his study. I The one hundred non-pitching baseball players in the sample 
have played at least six years in MLB and have achieved free agency. Fifty of these 
players had a one year contract and the other fifty had multi-year contracts. The multi-
year contracts range from four to seven years and span the years of 1997-2007. 
The sample of one hundred MLB players suppOlis the idea that multi-year 
contracts are awarded to those players who have demonstrated the best perfonnance. 
Table 1 shows that players with higher productivity tend to have a multi-year contract. 
Table 1: The Productivity of Players with One-Year and Multi-Year Contracts. 
One-Year Contract Multi-Year Contract 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
EqA 0.76 0.09 0.86 .10 
OPS 0.76 0.09 0.86 0.11 
AGE 29.46 3.83 30.11 3.76 
GAMESPLA YEO 123.74 29.08 130.61 27.17 
SALARY(millions) $2.23 2.33 $34.86 24.04 
Source: Baseball-reference.com 
Of these one hundred players I have included thirty different players with four 
year contracts and their statistics in my models. Note that the unit of observation is 
contract year. Thus, there are five units of observation for each player, one observation 
for each contract year and one for the year prior to the stmi of the contract. The total 
sample size is therefore ISO (five contract years times thirty players). 
I This website has been since removed but it can be found by using the archive website 
http://web.archive.org/web/web.php. 
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The players in this study represent each of the positions of a MLB team except for 
pitchers. Pitchers are not included in my sample because pitching statistics are less 
universal than hitting statistics and there are difTerent types of pitchers. The two types of 
pitchers (starting and relief) each have different statistics and different responsibilities 
making it difficult to measure a pitcher's productivity (Krautmann, 1990). On the other 
hand, productivity of position players are all measured in the same way when they are 
hitting which offers a consistent measure of productivity (Meltzer, 2005). Another 
reason that pitchers are not included is that there are different rules for pitchers in the 
different leagues. Pitchers tend to play different roles in each league which would cause 
their statistics to not be comparable. 
Also not represented in this study is any measure of the defensive ability of a 
player. The statistics that are available to measure defense represent the mistakes that a 
player makes rather than the ability of a player to make exceptional plays (Meltzer, 
2005). For example, the fielding percentage of a player remains at one (which means 
100%) and it only decreases as a player makes an error. However, it will not increase if a 
player makes an extraordinary play. Without the. ability to measure exceptional plays on 
defense there is not an accurate way to measure the productivity of a player's defensive 
ability. In addition to this, a player is acting independently of his teammates when he is 
hitting. The completion of a defensive play often depends on a player's teammates 
(Dinerstein, 2007). In other words, defensive statistics are not included in this study 
because of their ambiguity. 
All of the individual offensive statistics that make up the productivity statistics are 
available from the website baseballreference.com. The fonnula for OPS is 
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«hits+walks+hit by pitch)!(at bats+walks+hit by pitch+sacrifice fly»+(total bases!at 
bats). OPS is already calculated by the website. Baseballreference.com does not 
explicitly state the equivalent average for MLB players but it does provide each of the 
statistics that are needed to calculate equivalent average (EqA). EqA is calculated by 
(hits+total bases+ 1.5*(walks+hit by pitch)+stolen bases)!(total number of at 
bats+walks+hit by pitch+number of times caught stealing+(stolen bases!3» 
(http://www.baseballprospectus.com/atiicle.php?articleid=2596). EqA is a more 
comprehensive measure of a player's productivity because it includes more measures of 
offensive production such as statistics dealing with a player's ability to steal a base. 
As a result, I have chosen to predict two productivity measures: OPS and the 
EqA. None of the studies I have read have used the recently developed productivity 
measure of Equivalent Average so this paper furthers the existing research by using a 
new productivity measure. 
V. Empirical Model 
By combining the variables mentioned in the previous sections an empirical 
model is created that tests the hypothesis that there is pattern associated with a player's 
productivity during a multi-year contract. There are also dummy variables to represent 
each year of the contract. This is done to detect any shirking that may be occUlTing 
during the period of the contract (Berri and Krautmann, 2006). Also included in the 
model are two dummy variables to specify if the player's position is the shortstop or 
catcher position and a dummy variable to represent if the player changed teams when he 
signed the new contract. Dummy variables are included for catchers and shortstops 
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because these positions emphasize the defensive prowess of the players. The defensive 
abilities for catchers and ShOlistops are more difficult and so time has a higher value 
when it is spent training defensively instead of offensively. However, the opportunity 
cost of the time spent training for the defensive responsibilities is time that could be spent 
on offensive training. As a result, the offensive productivity of these players may be 
lower. Therefore, the final model is: 
Productivity of Player = a + �1(YEARI) + �2(YEAR2) + �3(YEAR3)+ 
�4(YEAR4)+ �5(GAMESPLA YED)+ 
B6(INCENTIVES)+ B7(CHANGETEAMS)+ 
�8(CATCHER)+ �9(SHORTSTOP) 
The coefficients in front of each year of the contract are relative to Year 0, the year 
before the multi-year contract begins. I expect all the coefficients in front of the contract 
years to have a negative sign except for B4 which will have a positive sign. This is 
because the theory developed earlier suggests that imperfect information and moral 
hazard propose that players with four year contracts may shirk the first three years and 
then increase their effort in the fourth year. The other coefficients that I expect to have a 
negative sign are �7 due to the psychological costs of moving to a new team and lor town 
and Bs and B9 due to the large physical demands of the catcher and shortstop positions. I 
expect the rest of the coefficients to be positive. The variables are summarized in Table 
2. 
The last year of a multi-year contract may have a positive effect on the 
productivity of a player because the contract is almost over. A player will need to sign a 
new contract either with the current team or another team if he wishes to keep working 
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with the MLB. In order to be offered a new contract a player will need to demonstrate 
that he is a productive player. Therefore, his productivity should rise in the fourth and 
final year of his contract. 
Table 2: Variable Definitions and Hypothesized Relationships to Dependent Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent 
EqA 
OPS 
Independent 
YEARI (-) 
YEAR2 (-) 
YEAR3 (-) 
Total offensive value per out 
On-base percentage + slugging percentage 
Dummy; I =Year I of contract, O=not 
Dummy; I =Year 2 of contract, O=not 
Dummy; I =Year 3 of contract, O=not 
Dummy; I =Year 4 of contract, O=not 
The number of games played by the player 
YEAR4 (+) 
GAMESPLA YEO (+) 
INCENTIVES (+) 
CHANGEDTEAMS (-) 
CATCHER (-) 
SHORTSTOP (-) 
Dummy; I =incentives built into contract, 0= no incentives 
Dummy; 1 =changed teams with new contract, O=no change 
Dummy; 1 =catcher position, O=other 
Dummy; 1 =shortstop position, O=other 
Noticeably missing from the model is a variable to represent the age of a player. 
Age can be a very strong detenninant of the productivity of a player because as the player 
ages his human capital begins to become obsolete. The player is not as quick or as sharp 
as he used to be which means his productivity will generally decrease as he gets older. 
However, my model is set up so that each productivity observation represents a year in 
the contract. Meaning, the four observations connected with each player represent each 
year of the contract. The age of the player will be highly correlated with the contract year 
variables since the movement to the next contract year is also an increase in his age by 
one year. Thus, age is not included in the model. 
I run this model using OLS regression to determine the significance of each of the 
coefficients to the independent variables. Once the regression is run, it is be possible to 
see if there is a pattern of productivity during a multi-year contract. 
17 
VI. Results 
Before running the regressions I did a closer inspection of the raw data. By 
creating a panel data set it is possible to see each player's productivity across their 
contracts as well as the average productivity for all thirty players for each year of the 
contract. Year 0 represents the year before the contract is signed regardless of what year 
the contract starts, Year 1 represents the year that the contract begins, Year 2 represents 
the second year of the contract and so on. The fIrst year that a contract begins is 1997 for 
some players in the sample and the last is 2003 for other players. Therefore the unit of 
observation in the following table is the player. Table 3 summarizes these results. 
Table 3 Th A : e verage P d ro uctIvlty ;q am or �ac (E A I OPS) f E h Y ear 0 a - ear f 4 Y C ontr act 
Productivity Measure Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
EgA 0.87302 0.84835 0.84216 0.85089 0.82241 
OPS 0.85667 0.84877 0.83520 0.84337 0.81010 
Based on these averages there is no concrete evidence that the MLB players in 
this sample demonstrate shirking. This result is consistent across both measures of 
productivity. The averages in Table 3 do not support the hypothesis of this paper because 
there is no increase in productivity during the later years of the contract. In fact, 
throughout the four years of the contract productivity tends to decrease. This is 
consistent with the results in Marburger (2003). For both productivity measures Year 3 
has a small increase in productivity but there is a substantial drop in productivity in Year 
4. 
One of the interesting results that is evident in Table 3 is the decrease in 
productivity between Year 0 and Year 1. This pattern is demonstrated by nineteen of the 
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thiliy players when looking at EqA and by seventeen of the thirty players when looking 
at OPS. For some reason, the players in this data set tend to have a decrease in 
productivity the first year of their contract. However, this change in average productivity 
between Year 0 and Year 1 is not statistically significant. 
It is important to discover if the difference between each of these means of 
productivity (i.e. between Year 0 and Year I, between Year I and Year 2, etc.) is 
statistically significant by running a t-test. If the results are statistically significant then 
there could be a pattern of shirking. In the following table Xo represents the mean 
productivity level of the year before the contract, XI represents the mean productivity 
level of the first year of the contract, and so on. The results of the t-tests are summarized 
in Table 4. 
T bl 4 T T t D t °fth Don a e : - es e ermmmg I e I erence B etween M ° St f O Il So °fi t* eans IS a Istica y Igm lcan 
Hypotheses T-Test (EqA/OPS) Statistically 
Significant 
Hal X > XI t= 1.003/ t= .281 no/no 0 
1-la2 XI > X t = .222/ t = .457 no/no 2 
Ha3 Xo > X.1 t = -.3111 t = -.267 no/no 
" 
Ha4 x, < x4 t = 1.173/ t = 1.267 no/no 
. . 
. .  . 
. *The crItIcal value oft at the .1 level at slgmficance for a one taIled test IS 1.297, the crItIcal 
value oft at the .05 level is 1.673, and the critical value oft at the .01 level is 2.396. 
The results of the t-test show that there is no significant difference between the 
means. The results were insignificant at the 10% level and for both measures of 
productivity. This means that the observed difference in means that were found in Table 
3 could have arisen randomly. 
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To further test if each year of the four year contract has any statistical significance 
I ran some OLS regressions. The results of the OLS regression with EgA as the 
dependent variable are summarized in the following table: 
T bi 5 E A R a e : Gq. egressIOn 
Variables 
YEARl 
YEAR2 
YEAR3 
YEAR4 
GAMESPLAYED 
CHANGE TEAMS 
INCENTIVES 
CATCHER 
SHORTSTOP 
Adjusted RZ 
N=150 
R I esu ts 
Model A 
-.013 
(-.636) 
-.015 
(-.730) 
-.006 
(-.306) 
-.020 
(-.926) 
.001 *** 
(4.582) 
-.023 
(-1.351) 
.061 *** 
(3.636) 
-.134 *** 
(-3.579) 
-.083 *** 
(-4.472) 
.370 
Values in parenthesis represent T -statistics 
*significant at .1 level 
**significant at .05 level 
***significant at .01 level 
Model B 
-.025 
(-1.164) 
-.032 
(-1.446) 
-.023 
( -1.048) 
-.051 ** 
(-2.347) 
----
-.043 ** 
( -2.398) 
.058 *** 
(3.227) 
-.165 *** 
( -4.195) 
-.093 *** 
( -4.683) 
.281 
The first regression includes each of the variables in the empirical model and is 
represented by Model A in the table above. Model A has an adjusted R2 of .37 and four 
of the variables prove to be statistically significant. These variables are the games 
played, incentives, catcher, and shortstop variables. All of these variables are highly 
significant with a significance value of less than .001. However, Model A does not offer 
support for the hypothesis that a player will demonstrate a pattern of productivity 
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demonstrating shirking during a four year contract when everything else is held constant. 
The sign in front of the YEAR4 does not match the predicted signs. In Model A's 
results, the YEAR4 variable has a negative sign which implies that a player will be less 
productive during the fomih year of his contract. However, the coefficient for this 
variable is not statistically significant. This means that in year 4 of a contract the 
equivalent average (and therefore productivity) fails to show the expected increase. This 
result goes against the hypothesis that the last year of a contract will cause a player to be 
more productive. 
The fact that all of the contract year variables have a negative sign is very 
interesting. This also seems to be consistent with the results demonstrated by the 
descriptive statistics. Since the coefficients in front of these variables represent the 
productivity of a player relative to year 0 the negative signs do tit with the descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 3. 
Model B is an attempt to improve the first regression. By removing selected 
variables from the regression it is possible to see if the contract year variables become 
significant. Model B removes only the GAMESPLA YEO variable. This variable was 
removed due the ambiguous nature of the GAMESPLAYEO variable. The number of 
games that a player participates in may be correlated with his shirking activity and 
therefore the year variables may not be completely accurate in Model A. Once 
GAMESPLAYEO was removed, the adjusted R2 becomes .28 compared to .37 for the 
complete model. The contract year variables all become more significant with YEAR4 
becoming significant at the 5% level. This is a large jump from the first regression where 
it is highly insignificant. However, the variable still has the opposite sign than predicted. 
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While significant the YEAR4 variable predicts that the productivity of a player will 
decrease by -.051. The other variable that became significant in this model is the 
CHANGETEAMS variable. Therefore, if a player changed teams it has a significant, 
negative effect on his productivity. This result is consistent with the belief that a player's 
previous team knows something that his new team does not. The INCENTIVES, 
CATCHER, and SHORTSTOP variables all remained highly significant. 
The exact same models were run again with OPS as the dependent variable rather 
than EqA. The results are summarized in Table 6. 
T bl 6 OPS R R a e : egressIOn esu ts 
Variables Model C 
YEARl .005 
(.230) 
YEAR2 -.004 
(-.173) 
YEAR3 .004 
(.189) 
YEAR4 -.013 
(-.555) 
GAMESPLA YED .001 *** 
(4.437) 
CHANGETEAMS -.031 
(-1.616) 
INCENTIVES .069 *** 
(3.720) 
CATCHER -.163 *** 
(-3.976) 
SHORTSTOP -.094 *** 
(-4.598) 
Adjusted Rl .379 
N=150 
Values in parenthesis represent T -statistics 
*significant at .1 level 
**signiticant at .05 level 
***significant at .01 level 
Model D 
-.008 
(-.330) 
-.021 
(-.896) 
-.013 
( -.555) 
-.047 * 
( -1.944) 
----
-.052 *** 
(-2.630) 
.065 *** 
(3.324) 
-.196 *** 
(-4.566) 
-.104 *** 
(-4.806) 
.297 
22 
The results from the OPS regressions are very consistent with the results from the 
EqA regressions and demonstrate a slightly higher adjusted R2s. YEARl ,  YEAR2, and 
YEAR3 remain statistically insignificant, although signs did change on some of the 
coefficients. 
Running both of these regressions confirm that the both dependent variables, EqA 
and OPS, perform equally well as proxies of productivity. In other words, the pattern of 
the regression coefficients was the same regardless of which model was used. The results 
of this study suggest that MLB players do not demonstrate a pattern of productivity that 
implies they have shirked during a four year contract. 
VII. Conclusion 
The main finding of this study is that there is no evidence of systematic shirking 
over a four year contract in MLB. These results are supported by descriptive statistics 
and multiple regression analysis. Table 3 shows average productivity did not change 
much over the course of the contract or demonstrate any pattern and therefore did not 
offer any evidence of systematic shirking. Multiple regression analysis shows that the 
year of contract variables were generally insignificant and where they were significant 
they often did not demonstrate the expected sign. Furthennore the same lack of pattern is 
seen when using OPS or EqA. All of these results do not support the hypothesis that 
MLB players demonstrate a pattern of systematic shirking. 
The hypothesis of this paper is that a player will demonstrate a pattern of shirking 
during the middle years of his contract. The thought behind this hypothesis was that a 
player with a multi-year contract would take advantage of the guaranteed salary, exhibit 
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moral hazard, and shirk during a few of the years covered by the contract. However, this 
study offers proof that this is not the case. INCENTIVES remained highly significant 
throughout each of the models the variable was included in. Therefore, the use of 
incentives will cause a player to be more productive than he might otherwise have been 
and may be the reason a player will not shirk during a multi-year contract. 
Therefore, owners need to be cautious when determining the contract for a player 
because a player that has an increase in productivity during the contract year may be 
having an unusual season instead of being a shirker (Dinerstein, 2007). A player may 
have the best season of his career, be offered a multi-year contract by a team, and then 
return to his natural level of talent the next year. However, the results suggest that on 
average, players productivity are remarkably stable over the course of a four year 
contract. 
By looking through various magazines, websites, or listening to sports talk shows, 
it is very common to hear a story about players who are shirking. RepOliers, owners, and 
fans all believe that players in MLB will shirk when they have the opportunity. They 
may be correct about some individual players but based on this study they may not be 
completely correct about professional baseball players as a whole. There are a few 
reasons why baseball players are not showing evidence of systematic shirking. 
One key reason for players not being able to shirk in the major leagues is all the 
monitoring that is available to the owners. The players have many different people they 
have to answer to when their perforn1ancc is not meeting expectations. In the dugout and 
the clubhouse the players have multiple coaches that arc watching them. Teams 
generally have a coach for every aspect of the game. For example, there is a hitting 
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coach, a pitching coach, a bullpen coach, and of course there is the clubhouse manager. 
All of these coaches make sure the players are doing everything they can to be the best 
hitter, pitcher, catcher, etc. 
In addition to these coaches, there is a general manager (OM) that is responsible 
for the make up of the team. He is constantly watching to see if there is some aspect of 
the team that needs improvement. Therefore, the players know the OM is watching and 
that if they shirk the OM may decide to invest in different players. Perhaps the most 
important source of monitoring, however, is done by the fans themselves. Fans come to 
the parks to see the team and they want to see a win. It is very easy for fans to express 
their approval or disapproval by not attending the games or buying the players' 
merchandise. Both attendance and merchandise sales make up a large part of a player's 
salary so in order to ensure that these actions continue and his salary remains high he 
needs to perform the best that he can. Otherwise, fans may no longer suppOli him if they 
believe that he is a shirker. 
Another reason that players may not be shirking is because owners may have 
discovered how to effectively utilize incentives. The players that may need the incentive 
the most are the star players that have a higher potential productivity than the average 
player. As a result, they can get away with shirking easier because their productivity 
even with shirking will most likely still be higher than the average productivity. Owners 
may have discovered this "trick." By offering incentives to the star players the owner is 
providing a reason for the players to play at their potential productivity. These incentives 
could discourage the players from systematic shirking by rewarding exceptional 
productivity. 
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A third possible reason that players may not be shirking combines the ideas of the 
efficiency wage and job security. The career of MLB players seems to be somewhat 
secure due to the smaller supply of people available with the necessary skills. However, 
there is less job security in this profession than is commonly accepted. Teams are finding 
new "stars" every year from the draft and other teams. These new stars could easily 
replace any player that is currently on the team. The fear of being replaced by another 
player can be enough to cause players to perform to the best of their abilities in order to 
not be replaced. In other words, it encourages the players to not shirk. The incentive to 
receive the benefits or recontracting will dominate the incentive for players to shirk 
during the contract year (Marburger, 2003). Another reason there is some lack of job 
security for MLB players is the risk of injury or being released from the team. MLB 
players have a very specific skill set that cannot be applied to jobs outside of baseball. 
The threat of a career ending injury or being released can cause players to work as hard 
as they can during their career to earn as much income as possible in order to be 
protected in case one of these situations occur. Once again, the players are encouraged to 
not systematically shirk. 
Adding to the idea of job security is the idea of an efficiency wage. It is common 
knowledge that the wages that are paid to professional athletes are generally very high. 
This may be because the owners are offering the players an efficiency wage. The basic 
idea is that the "above market" wage will cause highly skilled players to work harder and 
become more productive. The market cleming wage may not be a strong enough 
incentive for the players to be productive. However, the higher wages create a strong 
incentive to be more productive since along with the higher wages comes a bigger threat 
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of unemployment. The et1iciency wage that players may receive will cause an excess in 
supply of baseball players and therefore a higher threat of unemployment (McConnell, 
2009). The et1iciency wage becomes a strong incentive for players to not shirk. 
Also dominating MLB players' desire to shirk may be the knowledge that they are 
getting older. The older players get, the harder it will be for the players to start over with 
a new team. As they age, the players will begin to lose some of the skills that they had 
while they were younger. This knowledge that they will have to stmi over with a new 
team may push players to stay with the team they are on and work hard (Strober, 1990). 
A final reason, and perhaps the reason that everyone would like to be true, could 
be that MLB players have a strong desire to win. Players in MLB tend to have a very 
competitive attitude and they are not happy when their team does not perform well 
(Singell, 1993). A team does not perform well when there are players who are not 
producing as much as they should and are purposely shirking. The desire to win a gmne 
pushes players to perfonn as well as they can in order to achieve the satisfaction of a 
victory. Not only does it encourage players to perfonn as well as they can, but it also is 
an incentive to encourage their teammates to not shirk. The strong desire to win may be 
the best reason that players have to not shirk. 
One way to further this research is to find a larger sample of players to use. By 
increasing the sample size the results will be more representative of the league as a whole 
and it provides the opportunity to compare players who have incentives built into their 
contracts to those who do not. One might expect the players without incentives to 
possibly demonstrate a pattern of shirking. This will help determine which players in 
particular are more likely to shirk during their contract. 
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The results of this study suggest that MLB players do not demonstrate a pattern of 
systematic shirking. This could be for any of the reasons above or it could be that players 
are beginning to find ways to hide their shirking from fans, owners, and even from 
showing up in the statistics. Further studies could attempt to capture the effect of 
shirking during the off-season which may have a strong impact on how well a player 
perfonns during the season. With further work done on the issue, it may be found that 
multi-year contracts are not maximizing the productivity of the players but based on this 
study owners may be benefiting from offering multi-year contracts. Hopefully MLB 
players will continue to show this trend due to their desire to be the best and represent 
their fans. 
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